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Abstract 
This paper presents rigorous and direct tests of two assumptions relating to limited 
commitment and asymmetric information that underpin current models of risk 
pooling. A specially designed economic experiment involving 678 subjects across 23 
Zimbabwean villages is used to solve the problems of observability and quantification 
that have frustrated previous attempts to conduct such tests. I find that more extrinsic 
commitment is associated with more risk pooling, but that more information is 
associated with  less risk p ooling. The first of these results accords with our 
expectations and assumptions. The second does not. I offer two explanations as to the 
origin of the second result and discuss their implications for how we view the 
assumptions made elsewhere in the literature. I also conduct a test of the relevance or 
external validity of the experimental results to our understanding of real risk pooling 
behaviour. In four out of the five villages for which the test could be conducted the 
networks of risk pooling contracts constructed during the experiment and the 
networks existing in real life were significantly correlated. 
 
JEL Classifications: C93; D81; O12. 
Keywords:  Field  experiment;  Asymmetric  information;  Limited commitment; 
Villages; Economic development; Risk; Insurance. 
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Risk Pooling, Commitment and Information: An experimental test of 
two fundamental assumptions 
 
1. Introduction 
Over f our fifths of the world’s population do not have access to formal insurance 
against income and consumption shocks  (Holtzmann, Packard & Cuesta, (2000)). 
Recent  insights into how these people prepare for and cope with such shocks  are 
based on  the application of game and contract theory to informal risk pooling 
arrangements, informal credit, and reciprocal gift giving (e.g., Coate and Ravallion 
(1993), Fafchamps (1998)) and  on  the  increasingly innovative empirical  studies 
motivated by the resulting theoretical models. From these empirical studies we have 
learnt that full risk pooling  is rare (e.g., Ravallion and Dearden (1988), Morduch 
(1991), Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1991), Alderman and Paxson (1992), Townsend 
(1994), Ligon (1998)), that some types of shocks are more likely to be informally 
insured than others, that risk pooling is associated with certain forms of relationship 
(e.g.,  Grimaud (1997), Fafchamps and Lund (1997), De Weerdt (2002), Dekker 
(2003)), and that some theoretical models  explain the data more effectively  than 
others (Ligon, Thomas and Worrall (2002)).  
  But  are our  insights  well founded? T here are  a series of  assumptions 
underpinning all of this work that have yet to be explored and tested directly. These 
relate to: the origins and extent of commitment and its effects on risk pooling; and the 
degree to which information is asymmetric and the effects of this asymmetry on risk 
pooling. If these assumptions are ill founded so may be the insights and conclusions 
we have drawn from the analyses cited above.    3 
The assumption that limited commitment leads to less risk pooling is true by 
definition if, following Platteau (1994a, 1994b), Fafchamps (1992, 1996), Posner and 
Rasmusen (1999),  Kreps (1997)  and  others,  we  acknowledge that both extrinsic 
incentives,  especially  the sanctions that can credibly be threatened,  and intrinsic 
motivations, altruism, inequality aversion and reciprocal kindness, can act as bases for 
commitment. However, theoretical models of risk pooling focus exclusively on the 
former  and  we have yet to  distinguish  effectively  between  the two empirically. 
Kinship, co-ethnicity, shared clan membership,  and  religious co-affiliation  are all 
statistically associated with flows of assistance (Grimaud (1997), Fafchamps and 
Lund (1997), De Weerdt (2002), Dekker  (2003)), but is this  because such 
relationships facilitate the effective use of extrinsic incentives or because they are 
associated with relation-specific forms of intrinsic motivation?  
This ambiguity is problematic. For policy-makers the relative importance of 
extrinsic  incentives  and intrinsic motivations as determinants of behaviour has 
implications for the potential success of  certain  interventions. A  carefully planned 
reform of an informal, grass-roots institution, that is predicted to improve welfare 
under the assumption that people respond to extrinsic incentives, could crowd out 
cooperative behaviour and  lead to reductions in welfare  if, in fact, people are 
primarily intrinsically motivated  (Cardenas,  Stranlund, and Willis (2000), Bohnet, 
Frey, and Huck (2001)).  For  theorists and empirical researchers  the relative 
importance of extrinsic and intrinsic  bases for  commitment  may also  have 
implications for the effect of information asymmetries on the extent to which risk is 
pooled. If flows of assistance in times of need are intrinsically motivated is irrelevant 
and information asymmetries will have no bearing on levels of risk pooling.    4 
Even if extrinsic incentives are required to support risk pooling arrangements, 
it is possible to conceive of scenarios under which more rather than less information 
leads to less risk pooling. Suppose that,  as the experiments of  Falk, Fehr, and 
Fischbacher (2000), Bowles, Carpenter and  Gintis ( 2001), and Barr (2002) show, 
social or shame-based sanctions can be used to enhance commitment and that such 
sanctions are commonly threatened and applied. Also suppose that people can be and 
know that they c an be tempted into behaving in a manner that will attract such 
sanctions when the immediate individual returns to doing so are high enough, but also 
know that they will suffer regret if they are tempted, exposed, and shamed in this way. 
Then, an increased likelihood of detection or exposure could lead to less risk pooling 
as it is only by not entering into such arrangements that people can ensure that they 
will not be tempted to renege and suffer the shameful consequences. Using Elster’s 
(1984) terminology, choosing not to enter into risk pooling arrangements could be a 
form of pre-commitment.  
Alternatively suppose that, instead of questioning their own willpower and 
fearing  shame and regret, people are conflict averse,  in much the same way that 
Harowitz (2001) assumes countries to be. They fear reneging by others because they 
suffer not only the material consequences of being cheated but also the psychological 
consequences of conflict. If the second concern dominates, an increased likelihood of 
detection could lead to less risk pooling as not entering into such arrangements is the 
only way to ensure that one will not end up in conflict with a renegade. Such conflict 
aversion might also cause people to put less effort into gathering information even 
when it is relatively easy or costless to do so. In other words, they might choose to 
‘turn a blind eye’.  But this, along with the recent work of Boozer and Goldstein 
(2003) on information asymmetries within households,  calls into question the   5 
assumption often made by theorists, that within the tightly knit social groups that are 
likely to engage in risk pooling, information is unlimited. 
The reason why these assumptions have not been fully explored and directly 
tested  relates to problems of observability and quantification.  Such an  analysis 
requires data on how much risk is pooled, the degree of asymmetry in information, the 
extent to which extrinsic commitment is limited, and maybe even the incidence and 
content of intrinsic motivations. It has proven very difficult to generate these data, 
especially relating to commitment, using a survey-based approach. Here, I solve these 
problems by running an economic experiment that is novel in two regards. First, it is 
designed specifically for the task, making it the first risk pooling experiment to be run 
anywhere. And second, it is designed to support a  formal test of  its own external 
validity, i.e., its relevance to our understanding of real risk pooling behaviour.  
Within  the experiment,  subjects  were invited to pool risk under three 
treatments that varied with respect to the degree to which information is asymmetric 
and extrinsic commitment is limited. (Section 2 provides a detailed description of the 
experimental design.) The data generated during the experiment was used to test two 
hypotheses: (1) that when extrinsic commitment is limited less risk pooling occurs; 
and (2) that when information is asymmetric less risk pooling occurs. The results of 
the experiment support hypothesis (1). However, even though there is more reneging 
on pooling agreements when information is asymmetric, hypothesis (2) is rejected. 
Information  asymmetries  lead to  more  rather than less  risk pooling.  (Section  3 
presents the analysis.) 
To maximize the external validity of the experiment two unusual steps were 
taken: first, the experimental subjects were sub-Saharan villagers rather than students 
at a western university; and second, the risk pooling decisions within the experiment   6 
were made not anonymously with strangers via computer terminals or pencils and 
paper but face-to-face with fellow villagers. These steps also prepared the way for the 
test of external validity, to the author’s knowledge, the first formal test of external 
validity ever to be carried out. The test, which was conducted in five out of the 23 
villages,  involved a comparison of the  networks of  risk pooling  contracts formed 
within the context of the game with the networks of risk pooling contracts in real life. 
Using a technique developed by social network analysts I found that in four out of the 
five villages the experimental and real  risk pooling networks were significantly 
correlated. (Section 4 describes the test, the data used, and the results.)  
The paper concludes with a review of the assumptions commonly made by 
researchers working on risk pooling in the light of the experimental results (section 5). 
 
2. Experimental Design 
The experimental design has four components; the first is the choice of the subjects; 
the second involves the creation of a risky decision-making environment; the third is 
the provision of an opportunity to pool risk; and the fourth involves varying the 
degrees to which information and commitment are limited across subjects. 
 
Choice of subjects 
Most economic experiments are conducted in specially designed laboratories 
with university students as subjects. Usually, the subjects are assumed not to know 
one another and, often, their identity is kept private throughout the experiment. But 
here my objective is to simulate key aspects of the situations within which people in 
developing countries often but not always choose to pool risk. This objective can best 
be met by working with people in developing countries within the social groupings   7 
that are most relevant to their usual risk pooling endeavours. Thus, instead of 
university students my subjects are Zimbabwean villagers and instead of calling the 
subjects to a laboratory I take the experiment to their village meeting places. The 
results presented below relate to experimental sessions in 23 villages. A total of 678 
subjects were involved in the experiment, although only 642 took part in the second, 
more interesting round and only 618 took part in both the first and second round. This 
attrition and replacement occurred because in each village the experiment took place 
over two days and some of the subjects were called away on unforeseen business on 
the second day.  
 
Creating a risky decision-making environment 
I created a risky decision-making environment by conducting a near-
replication of Binswanger’s (1980) risk aversion experiment.  Each subject was 
confronted with a choice of six gambles. Every gamble yielded either a high or low 
payoff each with probability 0.5. Whichever gamble was chosen, the payoff was 
determined by playing a game that involved guessing which of the researcher’s hands 
contained a blue rather than a yellow counter.
1 If the subject found the blue counter he 
or she received the high payoff associated with the gamble of his or her choice. If he 
or she found the yellow counter, he or she received the low payoff associated with 
that gamble. The six gambles, drawn from Binswanger’s set of eight, are presented in 
Table 1.
2 Each is associated with a letter used to identify it during both play and the 
analysis. In Table 1, the column labelled ‘Blue’ shows the high payoffs associated 
                                                 
1 Binswanger used coin tossing as the randomising device. However, in Zimbabwe women did not 
know how to toss and many men thought they could cheat and focused on this rather than on other 
aspects of the game. The which-hand-is-it-in game, known as Chigigaro in Shona, is played by 
grandmothers with their grandchildren and by children together throughout Zimbabwe. Thus, we can 
reasonably assume that the probabilities in the game are well understood. 
2 The two inefficient gambles, introduced by Binswanger in order to explore subject’s understanding of 
the game, were left out.   8 
with each gamble in Zimbabwean dollars. The column labelled ‘Yellow’ shows the 
corresponding low payoffs, also in Zimbabwean dollars. The expected values, risk 
aversion classes as defined by Binswanger and ranges of partial relative risk aversion 
coefficients associated with each gamble are also shown. The gambles were presented 
to the subjects, many of whom were illiterate, as pictures on a specially designed card 
(see Figure 1). Each gamble was depicted as two piles of money, one (the high 
payoff) on a blue background and the other (the low payoff) on a yellow background. 
The subject had to pick the hand that had the blue counter in order to secure the high 
payoff on the blue background. 
At the time of the experiment, one day of casual labour would have earned a 
villager approximately 200 Zimbabwean dollars, although, such work opportunities 
were scarce. The official exchange rate was 50 Zimbabwean dollars to one US dollar. 
  In each village the subjects were called to a meeting, having been told that this 
was to be the first of two meetings to be held on consecutive days. Once the research 
team had been introduced, each subject met one of four research assistants in private. 
They were taught the gamble choice game, their comprehension was tested, and then 
they played. They were paid and then asked to sit separately from those who had not 
yet played to await further instructions. Tea and snacks were served. Once everyone 
had played, the next stage of the experiment was explained. 
 
Introducing the possibility of risk pooling  
The instructions then issued to the subjects varied across the villages (see 
Table 2). In three of the villages the subjects were told that during the meeting 
scheduled for the next day, they would be playing the same game once again. They   9 
were given copies of Figure 1 to aid any discussions they wished to hold and told the 
arrangements for the following day. This treatment is referred to as T1 below.  
In eight of the villages, having been told that they would be playing the same 
game once again, they were informed that they could, if they wished, form ‘sharing 
groups’ within which all winnings from the game would be shared equally. It was left 
up to the subjects whether or not they joined a group and, if they did, how large the 
group was to be. The monetary implications of sharing-group-formation were 
explained with the aid of simple examples. Once again the subjects were given copies 
of Figure 1 to aid any discussions they wished to hold and told the arrangements for 
the following day. This treatment is referred to as T2 below. 
 
Varying the asymmetry of information and the limits on extrinsic commitment  
Under T2 the subjects could not renege on the risk pooling arrangements they made 
amongst themselves prior to the second round of games, i.e., extrinsic commitment 
was perfect. In contrast, in treatments T3 and T4 reneging is possible, i.e., extrinsic 
commitment was limited, and information was variably asymmetric. In six villages, 
having been told that they could form sharing groups, the subjects were told that they 
could, if they wished, opt out of their sharing groups in secret after they knew the 
outcome of their own gamble. Once again the subjects were given copies of Figure 1 
and told the arrangements for the following day. Under this treatment, T3 below, 
commitment is limited and information is asymmetric. In the remaining six villages, 
the subjects were told that they could opt out of their sharing groups after they knew 
the outcome of their own gamble, but only if they were prepared to do so by raising 
their hand in front of the whole meeting when the question was asked. Under this 
treatment, T4 below, information is less asymmetric than under T3.    10 
 
The data 
The experiment generates two indicators of the amount of risk pooling that the 
subjects are undertaking. One relates to the subject’s decisions about group formation. 
If a subject joins a group containing n subjects in total, he or she is making n-1 risk 
pooling contracts. The other relates to their choice of gamble. Ceteris paribus, if the 
members of a sharing group select more risky gambles, they can be said to be pooling 
more risk in anticipation of a higher expected return. By comparing these two 
indicators across treatments  we can investigate the effects of  limited  extrinsic 
commitment and asymmetric information on risk pooling. 
 
3. Results 
Do subjects renege when commitment is limited? 
Before turning to the analysis of risk pooling, it is useful to look at reneging 
behaviour in the two treatments under which it is possible. Caution is required here as 
subjects could only renege if they were socially selected into a sharing group: a 
subject might not be selected if he or she is expected to renege. Thus, the statistics 
presented will be subject to selection bias. 
  Figure 2 describes the decisions made by those subjects that chose to join 
groups under T3 and T4. Under T3, 64 of 157 subjects joined sharing groups. Of 
these, 32 won high payoffs on the gambles of their choosing and of these 7 (22 
percent) reneged by opting out of their sharing group in private. All of the subjects 
who won low payoffs stayed in their groups. Under T4, 66 of 183 subjects joined 
sharing groups. Of these 34 won high payoffs on the gambles of their choosing and of 
these only one (three percent) reneged by opting out of her sharing group in public.   11 
All of the subjects who won low payoffs stayed in their groups. The proportion of 
renegades among high payoff winning group members differs significantly (five 
percent level) between the treatments, being lower when the reneging has to be done 
publicly. This suggests that subjects do fear social sanctioning when information is 
less limited.  
 
Group formation 
Figure 3 graphs the size of groups that each of the subjects in T2, T3, and T4 
joined prior to the second round of the game. To aid comparisons between the 
treatments, relative frequencies are shown. A group size of one indicates that the 
subject played solo, i.e., not in a sharing group. Thus, a direct comparison of the bars 
relating to each of the treatments on the far left of the figure is highly informative. 
Only 31 percent of subjects did not join sharing groups under T2 as compared to 59 
and 68 percent under T3 and T4 respectively. Turning to group size, it is in T2 that we 
see the largest group, a group of twelve. Groups of ten are a focal point due to the 
examples given during the instruction of the subjects. We see groups of 10 under both 
T2 and T3. It is under T4 that group size is most restricted. No groups of more than 
five were formed under this treatment. 
  In order to test the statistical significance of these variations, while controlling 
for other factors that may have influenced the subjects’ decisions, I conduct a 
regression analysis. Table 3 presents the results of a probit analysis of whether 
subjects joined a group and then a linear regression analysis of group size conditional 
on group membership. In each case the standard errors are corrected to take account 
of the potential non-independence of errors within villages due to group formation 
being a social process.    12 
In the first column of the table, the dichotomous variable that takes the value 
one if the subject joined a sharing group and zero otherwise is regressed on the 
following: two treatment dummies (T2 is the basis for comparison); five dummies 
relating to the choice of gamble that the subject made in the first round, included to 
control for how risk averse the subject is; a dummy indicating whether the subject 
won the high payoff in the first round; the number of households in the village, which 
corresponds to the maximum number of subjects attending the session; two dummies 
relating to the geographical area within which the subjects’ village falls, and one 
dummy distinguishing resettled villages from non-resettled villages. Only the 
coefficients on the two treatment dummies are significant and only these survive a 
general to specific process of elimination taking the ten percent level of significance 
as a cut-off. Under both T3 and T4 subjects are significantly less likely to join a group 
than under T2.  
If the size of the group that the subject joins is regressed on the same set of 
explanatory variables only one of the treatment dummies, the one relating to T4, is 
significant. The coefficient on this dummy variable is also significantly different from 
the one on the treatment dummy relating to T3. In addition, three of the other 
variables are significant in this model. First, subjects who won the high payoff 
associated with their choice of gamble in the first round joined smaller groups.
3 
Second, subjects in resettled villages formed larger groups. And third, subjects in 
Area 2, which has the poorest soil and least reliable rainfall, form larger groups, 
                                                 
3 This is not an income effect. When used in place of the high payoff dummy, actual winnings from the 
first round were not significant in the group formation regressions. Many of those who won high 
payoffs in the first round described how they avoided forming groups with those who received only 
low payoffs, while many of those who won low payoffs in the first round expressed a desire to be in 
groups with high payoff winners and disappointment at having to settle for being in a group of ‘loosers’ 
even though this was preferable to playing solo. This suggests that the subjects did not see the two 
rounds of gambles as independent probabilistic events. Such failures of expected utility theory have 
been observed in many contexts and should not come as a surprise here.   13 
although the area dummies did not survive in the general to specific process of 
variable elimination.  
 
Choice of gamble 
Figure 4 depicts the cumulative frequencies  for the subjects’ choices of 
gamble under T1, T2, T3, and T4. The most striking feature of these plots is the 
greater tendency for subjects under T2 to choose the riskier gambles. Over one quarter 
of the subjects under T2 chose gambles E or F as compared to between 10 and 13 
percent of subjects under the other treatments. Further, only seven percent of subjects 
under T2 chose gambles A or B as compared to between 14 and 17 of subjects under 
the other treatments. 
  A more careful analysis of gamble choice under the four treatments must take 
account of each subject’s decision in the first round, thereby allowing us to focus on 
the extra risk that the subjects take on when pooling is an option. Figure 5 contains 
four transition matrices, one for each of the treatments. The numbers within the 
matrices are percentages. The  ijth element of a matrix is the percentage of those 
subjects who chose gamble i in the first round and gamble j in the second round. The 
frequencies associated with the first round choices are shown beside the matrices. To 
aid the reader the cells of the matrices have been shaded in accordance with the 
percentage they contain. Darker cells contain higher percentages. When the high 
percentages are concentrated down the principle diagonal it indicates that most 
subjects chose the same gamble in both rounds. When the high percentages are 
concentrated in the middle two columns it indicates that the subjects tended towards 
the middle-of-the-range gambles in the second round regardless of their choices in the 
first round. If there are medium to high percentages in the bottom left-hand corner of   14 
a matrix it indicates that subjects chose less risky gambles in the second round. And if 
there are medium to high percentages in the top right-hand corner of a matrix it 
indicates that subjects chose riskier gambles in the second round.  
The matrices for T1, T3, and T4 display quite dominant principle diagonals 
combined, to varying degrees, with dominant middle columns. The option to risk pool 
under T3 and T4 appears not to be causing subjects to choose riskier gambles. In 
contrast, the matrix for T2 is shaded in the top right-hand corner indicating that a 
considerable  proportion of subjects chose riskier gambles in the second round. In 
Figure 6 the matrix for T2 is further sub-divided into those who did and did not join 
groups. It is in the former that we see the concentration in the top right-hand corner.  
  Once again, we can use a regression analysis to test the significance of these 
regularities in the data, while controlling for other factors that might have influenced 
the subjects’ decisions. Here, I run a tobit regression that takes account of the fact that 
the gamble choice sorts the subjects into intervals according to how much risk they 
are prepared to take on. The tobit was set up with reference to the bounds on the risk 
aversion coefficients associated with each gamble and presented in Table 1. Thus, if 
an explanatory variable bears a significant negative coefficient it indicates that an 
increase in that variable is associated with an increase in the riskiness of the chosen 
gamble. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4. In the first column the 
subjects’ choices in the second round are regressed on a set of five dummy variables 
indicating their choices of gamble in the first round (A is the base for comparison), 
their winnings from the first round,
4 and a set of six dummies indicating which 
treatment the decision was made under and whether they opted to be in a group or 
play solo (T1 is the base for comparison). All standard errors are adjusted to take 
                                                 
4 The large coefficient on the winnings variable may be indicative of an income effect or may relate to 
the perceived non-independence of gambles described in footnote 3.    15 
account of the potential non-independence of errors due to the social context within 
which the decisions were made.  
  The dummies relating to choice of gamble in the first round are jointly, highly 
significant. Those who won more in the first round assume greater risks in the second. 
The dummies relating to being in a group under T2, T3, or T4 are jointly significant, 
while those relating to playing solo under T2, T3, or T4 are not significant. A careful 
general to specific process yields the regression presented in the second column of 
Table 4. In this regression, of the treatment-group dummies, only the one identifying 
those who belonged to a group under T2 survives. The choices made under T3 and T4 
or by solo players under T2 were indistinguishable from those made under T1.  
 
4. A Test of External Validity 
While this experiment was underway, Dekker (2002) was conducting an in-
depth study of flows of assistance between households in five of the 23 villages. As 
part of her fieldwork Dekker asked every household in these villages to name the 
households in their village to whom they had given assistance and from whom they 
had received assistance. Here, I use Dekker’s data to investigate whether the groups 
formed during the experiment bear any resemblance to real risk pooling networks 
within these five villages.
5 
Dekker’s data takes the form of relational matrices. The ijth element in the 
‘assistance given’ matrix for a particular village takes the value one if household i 
reported giving assistance to household  j and zero otherwise. Similarly, the  ijth 
                                                 
5 There is no reason to expect that the five villages in Dekker’s study represent a biased sample of the 
23 included in the experiment. In her choice of villages, Dekker’s aim was to capture as much social 
diversity as possible while controlling for access to roads, other infrastructure and social services. 
There is a possibility that Dekker presence in the villages could have biased behaviour in the 
experiments. However, Dekker had not yet started work in two out of the three villages at the time 
when the experiments were conducted.    16 
element in the ‘assistance received’ matrix for a particular village takes the value one 
if household i reported receiving assistance from household j and zero otherwise. 
With no measurement error, one of these matrices should equal the transpose of the 
other. This is not the case and, consistent with there being a stigma associated with 
needing or receiving assistance and/or high status associate with giving assistance, 
many more relations involving the giving of assistance are reported, i.e., there are 
many more ones in the ‘assistance given’ matrix than in the ‘assistance received’ 
matrix. For this reason,  and because there is no way of telling which of the two 
matrices is a better reflection of the actual pattern of transfers,  the procedure 
described below is repeated twice for each village, once using the ‘assistance 
received’ matrix, and once using the ‘assistance given’ matrix.  
To facilitate the analysis another matrix relating to group formation within the 
experiment is constructed for each of the five villages. In these matrices the  ijth 
element takes the value one if the representative from household i in the experiment 
was in the same group as the representative from household j and zero otherwise. 
Then, the statistical correlations between the experimental group formation matrix 
and the corresponding ‘assistance given’ and  ‘assistance received’ matrices are 
calculated. A standard correlation assuming independence is not appropriate as each 
matrix represents a fully enumerated and interrelated social system. Instead, the 
following two-stage procedure was used. First, a simple matching coefficient between 
corresponding cells in the two data matrices is calculated. Second, the rows and 
columns of one matrix are randomly but synchronously permutated and the 
correlation recomputed every time. 10,000 permutations are carried out and the 
proportion of times that the match between the one observed and one permutated 
matrix is  greater than or equal to the  match between both  observed  matrices is   17 
calculated. This proportion is reported as the level of significance or p-value of the 
correlation. 
The test is subject to two sources of bias b oth of  which may suppress the 
significance of a  correlation and thereby render the test conservative. First, in 
Dekker’s data an actual flow of assistance is observed only if one household is in 
need and another is both willing and able to respond, whereas in the experiment only 
the condition of willingness needs to be met in order for two subjects to become 
linked by group membership. Dekker’s data implies an ex post flows of assistance 
while experimental co-group membership implies an  ex ante informal contract 
relating to a flow of assistance if unequal payoffs arise. Thus, the experimental group 
matrices are likely to contain many more ones than either of the ‘assistance’ matrices. 
This suppresses the significance of the correlations and renders it more likely that the 
denser ‘assistance given’ matrices will yield the significant results.  
The second potential source of bias arises if the subjects in the experiment and 
those making real life risk pooling decisions are distinct. Out of the five villages for 
which the test was conducted there was one in which this bias may have arisen. In 
Pedzanhamo a large proportion of the experimental subjects were young dependents 
rather than senior household members.  
The results of the correlation exercise are reported in Table 5. In three out of 
the five villages, Moturamhepo, Zvataida, and Mudzinge, the correlation between 
group formation in the game and patterns of assistance reported as given is 
significant. For one of the other villages, Muringamombe, the correlation between 
group formation in the game and patterns of assistance reported as received is 
significant. For the fifth village, Pedzanhamo, no correlation is found between 
reported assistance, given or received, and group formation in the game.   18 
5. Discussion 
The results indicate that more risk pooling takes place when  extrinsic 
commitment is unlimited;  under  T2  more subjects join sharing groups and group 
members take on greater risk. However, even then  a considerable proportion  of 
subjects choose not to join groups. One possible explanation is that these subjects are 
risk loving, although if this were the case we would expect to see significant 
coefficients on the choice of gamble dummies in the probit regressions. An alternative 
explanation is that they are being punished by exclusion for previous misdemeanours.  
When extrinsic commitment is limited and information is asymmetric less risk 
pooling takes place; in T3 and T4 a smaller proportion of subjects join groups and 
group members take on n o more risk than solo players. This result supports the 
commonly made assumption that limited extrinsic commitment reduces risk pooling. 
However, note that some subjects are not deterred from forming groups under such 
conditions suggesting that  intrinsic m otivations  may  be a sufficient basis for 
commitment for some agent dyads.  
Not in accordance with  commonly made assumptions is the finding that 
asymmetric information is associated with  more rather than  less risk pooling;  the 
information asymmetries are greatest in  T3 but it is under  T4 that  the  lowest 
proportion of  subjects  join groups and that the smallest groups are formed.  This 
finding suggests that individual responses to socially sensitive information might be 
more complex than we usually acknowledge. People may be conflict averse or may be 
highly motivated by anticipated shame and may not always trust themselves to act in 
way that minimises their likelihood of attracting shame. While the current experiment 
was not designed to distinguish between these hypotheses, it suggests that they might 
be usefully explored. Further,  the result suggests  that the full information within   19 
social groups such as villages is ill founded, that given the opportunity people may 
actually shy away from information, and that there might be a negative relationship 
between information and commitment. K nowing  when people renege may make 
relations too difficult, there may be value in being able to give people the benefit of 
the doubt in some circumstances. This challenges the verisimilitude of many of our 
theoretical models and the conclusions based on the related empirical work.    
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Table 1: First round of the risk pooling game: Choices, payoffs, 
expected values, and risk aversion classes 
Choice Blue Yellow EV RA class RA coeff.
A 100 100 100 Extreme infinity to 7.51
B 190 90 140 Severe 7.51 to 1.74
C 240 80 160 Intermediate 1.74 to 0.81
D 300 60 180 Moderate 0.81 to 0.32
E 380 20 200 Slight-neutral 0.32 to 0.00















Total number of players involved in Round 2 23 642
Repeat of first round after aproximately 24 hours
for players' discussions.
Players told that they could form sharing groups
if they wished and given approximately 24 hours
to do so. 
Like T2 but players also told that once they had
played they could opt out of their groups in
secret if they wished. 
Description
Like T3 but players must declare their decision
to opt out of their group in public.
 
   23 
Table 3: Group membership and group size 
Dependent variables = dummy taking the value 1 if in a group and number of group members 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Constant 0.430 0.670 0.625 0.165 *** 2.934 1.556 * 4.514 0.811 ***
T3 -0.891 0.417 ** -0.859 0.391 ** -0.428 0.623 -0.244 0.776
T4 -0.984 0.204 *** -0.982 0.212 *** -3.737 0.515 *** -3.287 0.575 ***
B (round 1) 0.297 0.257 -0.266 0.386
C (round 1) -0.102 0.255 -0.003 0.462
D (round 1) 0.182 0.266 0.239 0.426
E (round 1) 0.375 0.411 1.040 0.978
F (round 1) 0.034 0.353 0.239 0.980
Blue in round 1 -0.166 0.146 -0.457 0.244 * -0.400 0.234 *
H'holds in village -0.002 0.012 0.042 0.031
Area 2 0.450 0.276 1.811 0.857 *
Area 3 0.389 0.260 0.964 0.687
Resettled 0.053 0.371 1.686 0.432 *** 1.396 0.444 *
Joint significance 
of round 1 choice 0.155 0.766
Joint significance 
of areas 0.200 0.120
R
2 0.117 0.091 0.350 0.328
Obs. 568 592 260 260
Probit of group formation Group size conditional on formation
 
Note: Reported standard errors have been adjusted to take account of potential non-independence 
within villages/sessions. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% 
level. 
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Table 4: Choice of gamble in second round 
Dependent variable = riskiness of gamble as indicated by corresponding 
coefficient of partial relative risk aversion 
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Constant 1.700 0.318 *** 1.942 0.368 ***
Winnings in round 1 -0.003   6.02e
-4
*** -0.003   5.84e
-4
***
B (game 1) -0.267 0.318 -0.269 0.317
C (game 1) -0.287 0.334 -0.306 0.332
D (game 1) -0.058 0.368 -0.061 0.372
E (game 1) -0.911 0.350 *** -0.864 0.334 ***
F (game 1) -0.530 0.527 -0.571 0.539
Treatment 2 &  in group -0.346 0.236 -0.579 0.268 **
Treatment 3 &  in group 0.308 0.194
Treatment 4 &  in group 0.597 0.402
Treatment 2 &  solo 0.110 0.251
Treatment 3 &  solo 0.197 0.181
Treatment 4 &  solo 0.260 0.160
1.512 0.142 1.521 0.145
Joint sig of game 1 choice 0.000 0.000
Joint sig of treatment &  in a 
group dummies 0.056







Note: Reported standard errors have been adjusted to take account of 
potential non-independence within villages/sessions. * significant at 10% 





Table 5: Correlations between experimental and real 
risk pooling networks  
Village
Correlation with reported 
assistance given                   
(p-value)
Correlation with reported 






Mudzinge 0.065 0.268  
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Figure 2: Limited commitment and renegades in Treatments 3 and 4 
 
Joined groups under T3
64
low payoff high payoff
32 32
stay in opt out stay in opt out
32 0 25 (78%) 7 (22%)
Joined groups under T4
66
low payoff high payoff
32 34
stay in opt out stay in opt out
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Figure 5: Comparison of gambles chosen in first and second rounds 
Treatment 1 (T1) Treatment 2 (T2)
A B C D E F Subs. A B C D E F Subs.
A 0 20 20 40 20 0 10 A 18 12 12 18 12 29 17
B 0 13 27 53 7 0 15 B 0 0 41 27 14 18 22
C 0 8 42 46 4 0 24 C 1 6 40 31 13 9 80
D 3 14 31 34 14 3 29 D 1 4 37 37 14 7 73
E 0 0 0 50 50 0 2 E 0 0 20 30 30 20 10
F 0 17 33 33 17 0 6 F 0 0 0 38 13 50 8
Treatment 3 (T3) Treatment 4 (T4)
A B C D E F Subs. A B C D E F Subs.
A 0 6 50 28 6 11 18 A 20 10 15 45 5 5 20
B 5 19 38 29 5 5 21 B 8 16 24 40 8 4 25
C 0 10 51 36 3 0 39 C 4 4 53 28 7 5 57
D 5 16 39 30 5 4 56 D 6 13 43 28 11 0 54
E 0 0 38 38 13 13 8 E 0 0 20 60 20 0 10
F 11 0 33 33 11 11 9 F 0 20 40 20 0 20 5
Choice in round 2










































































Figure 6: Comparison of gambles chosen in first round and second 
round under Treatment 2 
Treatment 2 (T2) not in groups Treatment 2 (T2) in groups
A B C D E F Subs. A B C D E F Subs.
A 33 0 17 33 0 17 6 A 9 18 9 9 18 36 11
B 0 0 57 43 0 0 7 B 0 0 33 20 20 27 15
C 0 4 48 33 15 0 27 C 2 8 36 30 11 13 53
D 6 6 28 50 11 0 18 D 0 4 40 33 15 9 55
E 0 0 50 25 0 25 4 E 0 0 0 33 50 17 6
F 0 0 0 50 0 50 2 F 0 0 0 33 17 50 6
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